Altos Ventures Musings

The First Breaking Point

This is the second in a series of posts discussing rapid growth. The first post talked about the idea of startups as temporary organizations focused on “discovery” rather than “execution.” The successful ones grow to become companies that can deliver consistent results.  

In the venture capital industry, a startup experiencing rapid initial growth looks exciting. Ironically, this is usually when the first breaking point is reached. For example, according to this article about The Maturation of Mark Zuckerberg, even at a company as successful as Facebook, the grumblings started with as little as 25 people, just after a $12 million financing.

The Successful Startup Phase

When a company is tiny, communicating is easy. Everyone knows what’s going on. Everyone knows each other and dialog flows naturally across all levels. Talking to or hanging out with the CEO is not so intimidating. People may not have formal job titles but it doesn't matter because most people wear multiple hats and they do what it takes to get the job done.

There is no need to show off one’s knowledge. People know what you can do. People admit mistakes and acknowledge when they don’t know something. There is no defensiveness because everyone is focused on learning. The entire company is in “discovery” rather than “execution” mode.  However, nothing happens at a startup until someone does something. Execution does matter, even on day one. If someone doesn't pull his or her weight, word spreads fast and something is done about it. It's a matter of survival.

There is tremendous sense of urgency as people race against the clock to make something happen before time or money runs out. Startups get things done with impressive speed. Even with no business (or even a business model), everyone is committed to a common mission - it can be as vague as "put a ding in the universe." There is clarity and commitment around what needs to happen - like building a product or taking care of customers – so everyone is focused on getting things done rather talking about it. Meetings, if held at all, are usually short and informal. There are no politics, no competing agendas or competing business units fighting over resources.

The First Breaking Point

Force of personality and brute force might be enough to get the job done when a company is small but there aren't enough hours in the day or night. Due to growth – in customers, employees and complexity - things can feel out of control for the first time.

Around this time, startups feel an urgent need to switch into “execution mode.” The vast majority of dollars in the venture capital industry is invested after significant “traction” – evidence of rapid market adoption. Post funding, expectations can run high as new investors want to see companies “execute” and deliver results.

As startups shift into execution mode, doubts about management’s capabilities can creep in. This is not just investors’ doubt. It can be about co-workers and even self-doubt. If a company believes it is in execution mode, patience can run thin, especially if the burn rate is high. Every time plans change for the worse, credibility takes another hit. Explanations are seen as excuses. Investors hate surprises and so does everyone else, when in execution mode.

Eventually, there may be a push to hire executives who have “been there and done it before.” In Silicon Valley, ushering in “adult supervision” is almost a rite of passage. Unfortunately, after burning through more time and money, people realize that the business is not (yet) predictable, no matter who is in charge.

In the meantime, there may be subtle changes that lead to a cultural shift. New managers who are hired for their expertise may not have the agility or mindset of early employees. In the quest for predictability, risk taking may get snuffed out.

In contrast, in the early days, projections were seen as guesses. Plans were hypotheses that needed to be tested and validated. Negative surprises were seen as opportunities to learn and grow, rather than opportunities to cast blame in order to hold someone “accountable.”  

Reset Expectations

Getting through the first breaking point is not about rushing into execution mode. It’s a gradual process that will never end. A framework we’ve found useful in assessing progress along a continuum is the Capability Maturity Model (see the five levels of maturity below). It’s a development model whose origins trace back to studying software projects (and failures) in the 1960s when computer science was in its infancy and few “best practices” existed. Within any company, there will always be processes at different levels of maturity. It's important to keep in mind that even successful large companies will have chaotic episodes and continue to live with countless undocumented, ad hoc processes that are developed and refined over time. 

1. Initial - the process is new, ad hoc, chaotic and undocumented. Individual heroics are relied upon to get the job done. The focus is on outputs.
2. Repeatable - the process is somewhat documented. Repeating the same steps may be attempted. It’s not clear if the process will yield desired outputs.
3. Defined - the process is well defined, documented and confirmed as a standard process that can produce results.
4. Managed - the process is quantitatively managed in accordance with agreed-upon metrics.
5. Optimizing - process management includes deliberate process optimization and improvement. 

Conclusion/Lessons

• All growing companies go through the first breaking point so don’t panic and don’t over-react.
• There is no single moment in time in which a company switches into execution mode.
• Reset expectations. There are no short cuts to repeatability and predictability. It will take time, iteration and constant tuning.
• Remember essential qualities from the startup phase that will continue to be important.
  • Continue to balance discovery and execution. Focus on learning rather than blaming.
  • Get clarity and commitment around shared goals. Look out for political behavior and stomp it out.
  • Focus on getting things done. Output is more important than process. 

Beyond The Lean StartUp

“A startup is a temporary organization designed to search for a repeatable and scalable business model.” - Steve Blank

Once a startup has found product-market fit and a repeatable and scalable business model, what’s next? How about growing the business and building the company?

The graph shows Starbucks' revenues from the time they raised venture funding to $10 Billion. I was impressed as I observed the company during its formative years, when I was a junior Associate of a VC that invested, through the IPO in 1992. At the time, I did not fully appreciate what they were doing and had no idea what would be accomplished long after IPO. 

There is an awful lot written and discussed on the blogosphere about fundraising, building products, finding product-market fit and even the idea of building a "company" as the ultimate "product" in the way Steve Jobs thought about building Apple before his untimely death. Yet nothing I've read has provided much insight or practical knowledge on the topic we want to cover. 

Silicon Valley is full of start-ups. It is also full of big companies. The legendary ones, companies such as Apple, Cisco, eBay, Google, HP, Intel and Oracle, all grew to enormous scale from very humble beginnings. 

The vast majority of people working at hugely successful companies join long after employee number 1,000. They really don't understand what it took to get to the first 1,000 people. In fact, even people who experienced such growth may not understand because they were too busy to think about it. Yet, this is the topic we want to cover.

Somewhere between 100 and 1,000 employees, companies make the transition from startup, the "temporary organization," to a real company. This is where the serious money is made in the VC business.

Yes, once in a blue moon, there will be an Instagram. But the reality is it usually takes years, even decades of hard work to build a company with huge, sustainable value. A successful startup phase should be just the beginning, not the end.

Although we did once write about the Ramp Phase, we felt it was time to revisit the topic. It will be the theme for a series of posts for the rest of this year. We’ve only seen a few companies go through it but we have many more underway so it is a topic on the top of our minds.

We look forward to sharing our experiences and learning from others who have gone through this critical growth phase. If you have stories to share or can recommend people for us to contact who have gone through it, we would love to hear from you.  

 

Replacing CEOs

I regret to say that I've personally served on a dozen boards of venture backed companies that have replaced CEOs. It's usually not a good sign. It doesn't mean those start-ups were doomed; but it does mean drastic change was needed.

The decision to replace a CEO is never taken lightly. Replacing any CEO is difficult enough. Replacing a founder/CEO is even more traumatic and fraught with risk.

Although I have never seen a case in which a CEO, even a founder, is indispensable, over the years, my partners and I have formed a strong preference for founders.

Most founders have never been a CEO. Some may have never even had a corporate job (Mark Zuckerberg, for example). Yet we prefer to work with them as they learn on the job. 

I won't get into why we prefer founders (not the main topic of this post) but I'd recommend checking out these articles discussing the merits of founder CEOs: 

• I first wrote about our preference for founders three years ago: Ousting the Founder 
• Ben Horowitz wrote this more recently: Why we prefer founding CEOs 
• Steve Jobs' Law: Why Founders Make the Best Leaders

When my partners and I first got started more than 15 years ago, we replaced CEOs quite often (though I'd esimate it was about average for the VC industry as a whole. I'll share actual data later in this post). In contrast, my eight most recent boards have yet to replace a CEO.

One data point which reflects the presence of founder CEOs in venture portfolios is CEO ownership. When we tell people that the typical CEO in an Altos backed company owns more than twice the equity of a typical venture backed CEO, they assume it's because we invest less money (resulting in less dilution). While this is true, the bigger factor is that most of our CEOs are founders.

On average, the minute a board replaces a founder/CEO, that company's CEO ownership percentage drops. For example, when Eric Schmidt was hired at Google, the CEO ownership stake dropped to 4%, far lower than Larry Page's stake. 

Another reason we replace CEOs less often is selection bias. We are less likely to invest in the first place if we believe a new CEO will be needed. I'm always surprised when a VC submits a term sheet that calls for the retained search for a new CEO from day one.

We'd rather not make an investment, if we don't know who the CEO will be. As the saying goes, "go with the devil you know versus the devil you don't." We must believe, at least in the beginning, that the person we're backing can develop into a great CEO.

In the case of backing a "professional CEO" we must believe that the person has what Warren Buffett calls "owner mentality" (it might not be as good as founder mentality, but it's better than most). 

Of course, this does not mean that we will never fire a founder or replace a CEO. We make plenty of mistakes. To see if we might learn from them, I decided to look at some data from our current and past funds.

After studying a data set of more than 60 companies, I found that the probability of a CEO change increases dramatically with each new round of financing, unless a company is already profitable. A CEO who can control her own destiny is much less likely to get replaced. 

Given that the companies in this data set have raised more than a billion dollars from over a hundred different venture firms, I suspect that there is a similar pattern for the entire VC industry, even if specifics vary from fund to fund. 

In the chart below, each bar represents a group of companies based on how many rounds of funding were required to get to profitability or exit. The height of each bar represents the percentage of companies that replaced CEOs. 

  In companies needing only one or two rounds to get to profitability or exit, CEOs were replaced less than 14% of the time. At the other extreme, if a company needed four rounds or more, the replacement rate sky-rocketed to 85%. For companies that required three rounds, the rate was 53%, which is about average for the industry (see article below). 

Given this data, I'd advise start-up CEOs to get their companies to profitability sooner. Control your own destiny. Otherwise, deliver an exit before you run out of money and have to raise another round. 

Other Factors:

When a CEO is replaced, the rationale is usually quite subjective. "The team has lost confidence" or "lack of leadership" are typical quotes from board members considering a change. 

For me personally, I've learned that my stress level about any particular company goes up and down with confidence in the CEO, regardless of how the company is doing. Let me try to explain. 

Even if a company is doing really well, if I do not have confidence in the CEO, I tend to worry a lot because things might fall apart; and sooner or later, the shit usually does hit the fan.

In contrast, even if a company is struggling, if my confidence in the CEO is high, I stress less because I know there is a smarter and more capable person staying up at night not only worrying about things but doing something about it. 

That said, other than obvious reasons such as lying, cheating or stealing, I believe the following are other, more objective, factors correlated with change in CEOs:

1. Time - eventually, all CEOs retire, die or get fired.
2. Lack of growth - a flat profitable business might be OK for some but not for VC backed companies that promised high growth to investors.
3. Employee turnover - higher than normal turnover happens for two reasons: great people are hired but are repelled or mediocre people are hired and must be replaced. Successful companies typically have turnover rates that are significantly lower than industry averages. 
4. Burn rate relative to cash balance (key metric we track is months of cash remaining)

More Data:

The following article has some interesting statistics. Out of 50 high-profile VC-backed companies in 2010, 54% had replaced founder CEOs: "Do VCs usually fire founder CEOs?" 

I'd also recommend checking out these questions on Quora for more info and discussion:

1. On average how often do founding CEOs get replaced by a VC controlled BoD?
2. How do VCs eventually come to the conclusion that they need to replace the CEO?
3. What skills does a CEO of a growing company need that a founder CEO might not have?

Final Note

I'd like to emphasize that the data points out a strong correlation, not causation. For example, it's possible that VCs are more likely to replace CEOs in companies that run out of money and have to raise more rounds. It's also possible (and very likely) that start-ups that hire professional CEOs tend to raise more money and go through more rounds of funding.

Founders are much more sensitive to dilution compared to professional management that are granted more options if a company goes through a massively dilutive round. Founders also want to maximize control. The biggest fortunes have been amassed by founders who have been able to retain quite a bit of control over their companies, sometimes decades after the IPO.

The punchline of the article should be "get profitable" rather than "avoid the 4th round."

They Can't Tell You How To Soar

Customers will always tell you they want better products and lower prices. They might even be able to articulate how much better certain products should be. But don’t expect them to be able to tell you how different those products could be. More importantly, don’t expect them to tell you how you should surprise and delight them.

This was an insight from a book called Different, Escaping the Competitive Herd written by Youngme Moon (I won't review the book but I'd recommend it for entrepreneurs and marketers fascinated by inconic brands such as Apple, Harley Davidson, IKEA and InNOut Burger). 

As Clayton Christensen explained in the Innovator's Dilemma, there is a predictable pattern in just about every product category. Innovation leads to products that improve to a point where customers are over-served (the web browser might be the latest category to reach this level).

From a vendor's perspective, the problem is that over-served customers become so skeptical about the differences between products and brands that differentiation is rendered meaningless. Most customers become not only bored but unhappy.

In category after category, over-served, bored and unhappy customers would love to discover something delightful, remarkable and refreshing. And marketers spend billions of dollars trying to rise above the competitive noise.

Ironically, intense competition only quickens the pace toward blandness and a herd mentality in markets. This trap is hard to escape. The herd phenomena is seen in self-organizing systems as disparate as ant colonies, bird flocks and stock markets. 

Paradoxically, the best way to stand out, might be to NOT focus on beating the competition. At the 1997 WWDC, before he rejoined Apple as CEO, Steve Jobs stated the following (32:43 of video):

"...the other thing I feel very, very, very strongly about is, it's incredibly stupid for Apple to get in a position where for Apple to win Microsoft has to lose. That's really dumb... Apple can win without having to have Microsoft lose."

Don't focus on being better. Don't fret over differentiation. Think Different. Be different. Transcend boundaries. Stand alone. Walk down a very lonely path. 

Something that every entrepreneur should keep in mind is what Jerry Garcia once said: 

"You do not merely want to be considered just the best of the best. You want to be considered the only ones who do what you do." 

What will you do? How will you be different? One place to start, is to be yourself. Be genuine.

To really, really soar, don't just be better, faster, cheaper. You can do better than that. And please, please, please, don't aspire to be "the Mint of XXX category" or "the AirBnB or YYY category" or the "Groupon of XYZ category."

Don’t Drink Your Own Kool-Aid

 

In my twenty years of working in and with startups, I’ve continually tried to figure out what makes some work and others not.  There are myriad factors of brilliance, determination, luck and timing that go into the success equation.  One of the most important and overlooked characteristics of successful entrepreneurs is objectivity: the ability to see and deal with reality in making decisions.

By their nature, startups are driven by passion, optimism, persistence, hope and dreams.  All these traits are essential to fueling the process of inventing a product and innovating a business model.  The beautiful thing about startups is that they are emotional and intellectual creations brought to life through shared vision and hard work.  

Company founders and CEOs get employees, customers and investors to take innumerable leaps of faith on the way to fulfilling their entrepreneurial visions. Mixing the Kool-Aid is an essential part of building a company (see also: eating your own dogfood).  But drinking your own Kool-Aid is the enemy of sound decisions. 

Here are three signs that you might be doing it:

1. Illusion: Some would say that most of the factors that drive success are outside of an entrepreneur’s control.  But most entrepreneurs suffer from the illusion of control - “the tendency for people to overestimate their ability to control events.”  This is as true for CEOs of small companies launching new products as it is for large companies planning corporate takeovers.  It is critically important to understand the difference between things you control and the things you don’t – and be clear and objective about that.

2. Hope:  Closely related to the illusion of control is optimism bias, or the "tendency for people to be over-optimistic about the outcome of planned actions."  While optimism is a fundamental part of entrepreneurism, its evil twin is hope.  The more desperate a company’s situation, the more you hear the word “hope” driving business decisions.  In a company meeting last week, my Spidey senses perked up when the CEO described the company’s next product launch in all-too-hopeful language.  He was “hoping” for vast improvements in four separate metrics (traffic, registration, engagement and conversion) to click in just the right way.  Did I want it to happen?  Absolutely.  Did I think it would?  Absolutely not.  As the old saying goes, “hope is not a plan.”

3. Spin: Good spin is essential to marketing your product to the world, but behind closed doors with your team or your board, you have to be brutally honest about the facts.  Startups are all about learning, and if there’s even one degree of spin on the data, it’s hard to learn the right lesson.  If your board meeting agenda looks like an actuarial recitation of facts and metrics, you’re on the right track.  If your board meeting agenda looks like a pitch deck, you’re not being objective.  Beware of underestimating competitors.  Beware of prematurely declaring victory.  Beware the phrase “conservative projections.” 

How can you avoid drinking too much of your own Kool Aid?  Here are a few ideas:

1. Metrics:  My investor friend Dave McClure is piratically fanatic about metrics.  Follow his advice: get religious about metrics.  Bad decisions thrive on incomplete data, speculation and opinion.  My favourite companies post their metrics up on big screens for everyone to see. The more you can instrument your business, the fewer places there are for bad decisions to hide. 

2. Culture:  As a leader in a company, it is critical to create a culture that allows for open, fact-based dialogue and dissent.  Highlight team members who get it right while being honest and self-deprecating about your own bad decisions.  Celebrate unconventional ideas.  Designate someone on your team to take the devil’s advocate role.  Beware groupthink. 

3. Friends: Friends don't let friends drive drunk.  And your good friends, your real supporters in the entrepreneurial enterprise, should not let you fool yourself either.  Don't surround yourself with people who just reinforce your worldview.  Surround yourself with advisors and investors who are honest enough to call bullshit.  But don't confuse brutal honesty with a lack of enthusiasm for you or your business.  It is absolutely necessary.

Every entrepreneur needs to mix some pretty strong Kool-Aid to persuade employees, customers and investors to come along for the fantastic ride of building a new company.  But the really great entrepreneurs know not to drink their own.

Another Perspective on Yahoo!

Paul Graham published an essay about "the problems that hosed Yahoo" which got shared by many people via Twitter and Hacker News. Many people called it "customarily brilliant." 

I really enjoy Paul's writings but this one didn't sit well with me. I disagreed with key points and came away concerned that young entrepreneurs would learn the wrong lessons from history.

In the essay, Paul suggests that Yahoo failed due to two problems - 1) easy money and 2) ambivalence about being a technology company.

Money

Paul takes us back to 1998, when Yahoo was riding high, making money from big brand advertisers as well as over-funded, "fat startups" (a term popularized recently by Ben Horowitz). In Paul's words, Yahoo was "a de facto beneficiary of a pyramid scheme."

I agree that too much easy money, especially over-funding, can harm companies. Too much money can mask problems. That said, I don't think it had much to do with Yahoo's demise.

We can second guess how Yahoo could have re-invested profits but I would not fault them for pursuing it. They built a very successful company which beat every competitor of their era. 

Everyone benefited from the bubble. If Yahoo had not taken the money it may have been diverted to others and weakened its competitive position. You have to be in the game to even have a chance at riding the next wave. 

Maybe what Paul meant to say was that Yahoo management should have recognized that they were lucky or that their business model was not sustainable?

In hindsight, it's clear that Yahoo did not appreciate the potential for search and perhaps over-estimated the quality of their revenues. But, as Paul acknowledged, no one else, including Larry and Sergei, knew how big search was going to be, in 1998.

It's hard to predict the future and deceptively easy to come up with simplistic explanations in hindsight. Yahoo beat its competitors hands down and built a very profitable, growing business. I would not diss them for it.

Paul's second point was about culture and leadership.

Hackers 

Paul suggests that Yahoo was a technology company but either didn't know it or were ambivalent about it. He also seems to imply that if hackers had run the place Yahoo would have been fine (or at least would not have been hosed).

I disagree with both points.

Yahoo was never a technology company. They were a media company (albeit a "new media" company) from the day that Dave and Jerry started serving up pages from their trailer at Stanford.

When Mike Moritz invested in Yahoo, it was the emerging brand and traffic that impressed, not the technology. Unlike Google, there was no core technology from day one. Later on, Yahoo did develop many technologies - they had to in order to scale (Hadoop is one example).

Bill Gates would have also said that Yahoo was never a technology company. When Gates saw Google, he saw a company that reminded him of Microsoft. It was probably the only company that ever scared him. He never had that reaction to Yahoo.

The important thing is not to be like a Google or Facebook (or the early Microsoft). The important thing is to be yourself. Be authentic. Be genuine.

So maybe Paul's point is that Yahoo didn't know who they were. Perhaps, but I disagree that Yahoo had to be like a Google or Facebook because that is not who they were.

Pixar is a great media company. The fact that they were founded by technologists doesn't confuse them. They even sell rendering software to other companies, including competitors. It doesn't diminish their identity as a media company. 

Disney is another example. Walt Disney Imagineering has been inventing cool new technologies for decades. They were the "new media" company of their generation. You don't have to fit someone else's mold. Be yourself. Be unique.

Another key point Paul seems to make is that "adult supervision" is bad. Implication seems to be that if hackers had run the place Yahoo may not have lost. Again, I disagree. 

There is good adult supervision and bad adult supervision.

Amazon is an interesting case study that, on the surface, defies hacker conventional wisdom. Even as they delve deeper into technology, Amazon's management is stacked with MBAs.

Even their most technical businesses, Amazon Web Services and Digital Media (including Kindle), are led by a Harvard MBA and a Stanford MBA, respectively. Even so, Amazon continues to attract and retain plenty of good hackers. In fact, momentum seems to be increasing in the hacker community. 

There is nothing inherently wrong with adult supervision or non-technical management per se.

That said, I do think people can get seduced by the belief that there is a mythical "world class" management team that can fix your company. On this front, I think Paul and I probably agree. Don't count on someone coming in from the outside to fix your company (or, in the case of Yahoo, your stock price). 

When the bubble crashed, Yahoo looked for a savior. In contrast, Amazon stuck with Jeff Bezos even though their stock took a similarly huge beating. Bezos likes to remind everyone how the pundits called them "Amazon dot toast."

Terry Semel knew little about Yahoo or the Internet when he took over in April, 2001. It quickly led to the mass exodus of the future leaders of Yahoo. The fallout we are witnessing now may still be the after shocks. 

To conclude, I'd like to share a great story about how Nike is still shaking up the shoe industry. When Phil Knight retired after almost 40 years as CEO, he decided to bring in fresh blood and passed over the leading internal candidate for CEO. 

Luckily, Nike had such a strong culture that it quickly rejected the outsider. The new CEO, from S.C. Johnson (the makers of Pledge, Windex and other cleaning products) lasted only 18 months. The new CEO is a home grown prodigy - a former shoe designer who was the internal CEO candidate in 2003. 

With 33,000 employees, there is plenty of "adult supervision." It just happens to be the right kind. 

25 Heat Seeking Missiles (and 10 Key Lessons)

First Round Capital's Josh Kopelman recently wrote a great post talking about entrepreneurs as heat seeking missles. Here is an excerpt:

I've lately started to realize that our most successful companies are led by entrepreneurs who have a unique talent -- they are heat seeking missiles.  It doesn't matter where the missile is aimed pre-launch.  Successful entrepreneurs are constantly collecting data -- and constantly looking for bigger and better targets, adjusting course if necessary.  And when they find their target, they're able to lock-onto it -- regardless of how crowded the space becomes. 

At the end he says

You can't predict success based on where a missile is pointed pre-launch.  Instead you have to assess the quality of the targeting system (the team) and the density/size of targets (the market).

He makes a great point. If you want to read about many more "heat seeking missiles," I’d recommend a book called “Retail Superstars” by George Whalin (http://www.retailsuperstars.com/) which talks about 25 great entrepreneurial success stories.  

I LOVE observing and studying great retail entrepreneurs because there is nothing quite like the retail business. There is no other business which puts entrepreneurs in front of customers so close, so personal and so often. I grew up in a retail environment. My mother owned franchised Hallmark Card and Gift shops and I remember chipping in, working every Christmas season, helping customers and gift wrapping thousands of presents over the years. Depending on the person and who the gift was for, I often made small, last minute adjustments on the type of wrapping paper, ribbon or knot (also, I did it to keep it more creative and interesting).  

The book essentially describes 25 great entrepreneurs (and their families, since most are family-run) and the story of how they built fantastic businesses which have not only survived but thrived in this most recent era of retailing dominated by Wal-Mart and big box retailing. 

The assault on independent store operators (most of which are run by entrepreneurs) didn’t just happen with Wal-Mart (which got started in the mid 1960s). There is a book called “Chain-Store Retailing 1859-1950” which chronicles how chains such as Sears, Montgomery Ward and JC Penny began spreading across America putting local merchants out of business along the way. The chains were becoming so powerful that in the 1920s and 30s, some communities and even states enacted laws to limit the number of new stores by chains.

The "retail superstars" defy conventional wisdom and epitomize the “think different” approach that all great entrepreneurs take. They provide proof that great entrepreneurs can succeed, against all odds, in ANY market against even the toughest competition.  The book is truly inspirational (if you love and admire entrepreneurs).

The top 10 lessons and common traits across the 25 retail superstars are:

1. There was no up-front plan or even long term vision. “When asked whether their companies had been built based on a business plan or set of guidelines, they invariably answered no, their growth was guided by what customers wanted and expected from their stores, what the marketplace dictated, and how they could best serve their customers.”
2. They got started with no outside funding - and ALWAYS with very modest stores, or sometimes no store at all - like selling fruit out of a cart. They all became hugely successful, one modest step at a time.
3. They are scrappy survivors. Many suffered disasters, even death as some businesses moved from generation to generation, yet they all kept growing.
4. They hired great people (friendly, knowledgeable staff) and kept them for a long time (which is unusual in retailing). They took care of their people who, in turn, took good care of their customers.
5. They embraced change and instilled a culture within their companies to allow staff to innovate and adapt to the needs of their customers and communities.
6. Even as circumstances changed, they maintained long term relationships both inside and outside of their stores. Repeat customers and word of mouth advertising fueled growth in each business. They figured out viral marketing long before it was so hip.
7. Surprisingly, they used technology to their advantage. Technology is just a means to an end. Most used the Internet and social media to engage their customers and broaden their reach (before the Internet, they used catalogs and direct mail). Every single business in the book grew with an absolute focus on the customer. If technology is useful for that purpose, it should be used.
8. They all gave back. Each retailer were pillars of their communities and incredibly generous to various causes around their communities with not only money but time and thoughtfulness.
9. They defied conventional wisdom and showed that there are many ways to succeed. Some retailers had great selection and huge stores. Others were focused and had very small stores. Some retailers offered great value and led with price. Others catered to the very high end and would give you sticker shock! Some operated in very big cities and big markets. Others operated in very small towns in the middle of no where where customers would have to drive miles to visit - yet they all built very successful, growing businesses.
10. A company can lose its soul when hired guns (i.e.“professional management”) take over. Home Depot was a fantastic entrepreneurial success in its growth phase when it started out employing skilled carpenters, painters, plumbers and electricians to work in its stores. “They served their customers well and the company grew into the largest home center retailer in the country. When management changed and a take-no-prisoners, cost cutting approach was adopted, most of those full-time craftsmen got caught in the cross fire. Without skilled employees, Home Depot’s sales suffered and its sterling customer service reputation was tarnished.”

One great retailer not covered in this book is Borsheims in Omaha, which operates the largest jewelry store outside of Tiffany's in NYC. It's the place Bill Gates flew his private jet to to pick out a ring for Melinda (their buddy Warren Buffett owns it). Nebraska Furniture Mart is another great retailer, also in Omaha, and also owned by Warren Buffet's Berkshire Hathaway. 

Woodman's is one of my favorite success stories of all time. No book has been written about them, unfortunately. They are an employee owned chain of grocery stores in WI and IL and have built a $1B+ business that has been evolving and growing for decades and will continue to kill the local Safeways, Whole Foods and Wal-Marts (http://www.woodmans-food.com/). One can learn a lot about how to compete and run a defensible business by studying a company like that. 

One of my favorite retailer-entrepreneurs, Barnett Heltzberg, wrote a book called "What I Learned Before Selling to Warren Buffet." I've blogged about him in the past and it's worth a quick read if retailing or entrepreneurship fascinates you. His key lesson was "Focus on the Controllables" (http://www.blog.altosventures.com/vc/2007/06/the_controllabl.html).

Finally, one of my favorite entrepreneurs of all time is Sam Walton. There have been so many articles and books written about the man as well as his company but the one I'd recommend is "Made in America." 

What Did Bill Gates Worry About? Lean or Fat?

I found this from the transcript of a Charlie Rose interview with Ken Auletta, right after "Googled" was published. It is interesting to hear about what Bill Gates worried about back in 1998, near the all time peak of his power (and the peak of the fat startup era). 

CHARLIE ROSE: And are they on the cutting edge of exciting stuff or are there two more kids in a dormitory room at Stanford that are about ready to come up with something that’s going to blaze new trails? 

KEN AULETTA: Well, we don’t know that. That’s the great thing. I mean, I think I may have told the story when I was on your show, I tell in my book that Bill Gates in ‘98, when I asked him what he worried about, he didn’t say the obvious, which is "My competitors, Netscape, or Oracle or Apple." He said "I worry about someone in a garage inventing something that I haven’t thought of." 

(LAUGHTER)

That year there were two guys in a garage. 

CHARLIE ROSE: Sergey and Larry in a dorm, yes.

KEN AULETTA: Google has the same reason to worry. What is that new technology? One thing they are conscious of is social networking and that could pose a problem for search. 

 

Now, I should also point out that Mark Zuckerberg started Facebook in a dorm room while Kleiner Perkins and Benchmark funded Friendster and Sequoia funded Plaxo during the very early days of social networking.

I feel like a broken record but this is something I wrote in 2006 in Venture Lotto:

The most sought after deals are led by proven managers. Especially popular are entrepreneurs who have made money before - they get investors lining up like sheep.

Ironically, the people who end up creating the blockbusters are usually unproven managers. They emerge from the fringes, and start small, in niche or overlooked markets. They take time to learn and iterate and burn very little capital before turning profitable. They follow a slower, but lower-risk path. In our own portfolio, the companies which raised less funding not only performed far, far better but had much lower failure rates.

Entrepreneurs can't count on a portfolio. The best ones we know are much more risk-averse than conventional wisdom might suggest. They don't take foolish chances. They spend money as if it were their own. They observe, listen and adapt; but fundamentally, they strive to control their own destinies, which is best done by generating profits. They do need a little capital, but they want help and advice even more. 

Ben Horowitz Makes Compelling Case for Lean

Like many of you, I've been following a fascinating and important debate between Ben Horowitz and Fred Wilson over the past couple of days. To recap, it all started with this post: The Case for the Fat Startup.

Fred then responded with Being Fat is Not Healthy which has received a lot of comments worth reading, including some comments from Ben. 

Then earlier today, Ben responded with the best post of all The Revenge of the Fat Guy.

After reading through the posts, I've come to the conclusion that Ben and Fred actually agree on the fundamental points. In fact, the most important point was already made by Steve Blank last year in Lean Startups Aren't Cheap Startups.

Steve, a key figure in the lean startup movement, felt the need make the case that you cannot confuse lean with cheap. He concludes with the point that if you confuse the concepts "when you do find a repeatable and scalable sales model, you will starve your company for resources needed to scale."

The reason I love Ben's latest post is that he helps debunk some myths about Product-Market Fit, which, according Marc Andreessen, is "the only thing that matters" Along the way, he also makes a compelling case (though perhaps unintentionally) for staying lean. 

Ben's post should be a warning for entrepreneurs and VCs who put too much faith behind the magical product market fit concept. Here are some things to watch out for:

1. Product market fit is NOT a discrete, big bang event. If you are fortunate to find product market fit, you will most likely get there through lots of hard work "through partial fits, a few false alarms, and a big dollop of perseverance...there’s no formulaic answer."
2. It's NOT obvious when you have product-market fit. "It’s usually not black and white."
3. Once you achieve product-market fit, you can lose it.
4. Once you have product-market fit, you still have to "sweat the competition."

All of these points should serve as a warning for people with too much money to spend (or invest) and eager to step on the gas once product market fit is found. Given all of the uncertainties, it would be prudent to maintain some humility even if you believe that you've found product-market fit (you can also reach the opposite conclusion - even when in doubt, step on the gas - it's just not the path I'd recommend). 

Ben's last point is important to consider because, on the surface, it makes a case for the fat startup. Since "the best markets are usually the ones in which competition is fierce" you should invest aggressively to make sure you win the market."

I would ask, how much should you raise/invest? How about a billion dollars as Webvan did?

In any huge new market, there is no question competition will heat up. But even a billion dollars is nothing when you are talking about competing against the big guys. 

Rather than focusing on how much money to raise, how about focusing on producing profits and creating a sustainable business model?

When I look at competitors, the ones that scare me are the ones that have found ways to make money and scale at the same time. The "fat startups" that are burning through millions or tens of millions of dollars a month don't scare me.

Ben says that you can't win the market by saving your way there. I totally agree. But conversely, you can't win by spending your way there either. Even if you raise hundreds of millions. For every Loudcloud/Opsware, there are dozens of craters. As David Packard liked to say, "more companies die from indigestion than starvation."

There is no question that Ben is a great entrepreneur who knows first hand how difficult it is to build companies. He knows that it often takes more money and longer than you'd like. So it would make sense to raise more money than you think you need. If someone offers to invest boatloads of money in your company at a great price, you should consider taking it. I agree. But even Ben has said that it should not be your plan A.

If you are one of the very fortunate entrepreneurs who is able to get boatloads of funding at a great price, you should be careful to resist pressures to spend that capital from excited investors. You need to also do your best to resist your own temptations to pursue every great idea that you and your great team comes up with to win the market. A company growing on profits just tends to be much more disciplined than one growing based on boatloads funding.

Just as Ben agues that Twitter is the exception, not the rule, I'd say that Loudcloud/Opsware is the exception, not the rule.

Even Loudcloud/Opsware is not a very compelling case for the fat startup. They raised $346mm in 15 months and went public in March 2001. By September 2002, market cap had fallen to $28mm, which was less than cash on hand and about 8% of capital raised to date. That sounds like value destruction to me. If you were an investor or employee, you'd be pretty bummed right about then.

Then an amazing thing happened. From 2002 to 2007, the company raised no more capital and created tremendous value - great job Ben! They exit for $1.6B in September 2007! I would guess that there was a lot of great technology created in the prior 2 years that helped. But I would also guess that the thought of running out of cash was pretty scary when you are at a $28mm million market cap. If I were in their shoes, I would have been more determined than ever to get to profitability so that I would never have to raise more funding. 

To recap, during the first era (Loudcloud), hundreds of millions are raised and return almost nothing. During the second era (Opsware), if you bought stock, which was publicly available, so any of you could have participated - you did NOT have to be a famous entrepreneur or a hotshot VC to get a chance to invest - you would have made a spectacular return.

Ben Horowitz just reinforced my belief that "fat startup" is not only a bad idea but a dangerous one. Just as the lean startup concept can be harmful if people misunderstand the key points, the fat startup concept can also be harmful. In fact, it can be a LOT more harmful to the VC industry. Entrepreneurs will also suffer from excessive dilution, recaps and wasted lives pursuing bubbles and false dreams.

I'll end with a concept Warren Buffet has repeated over and over again - don't count on the kindness of strangers to save you. Make sure you have enough cash on hand. To me, that is not an argument for the fat startup, it's an argument for the lean startup.

Celebrity Investors, Board Members and Advisors

"The quality and quantity of the financial backing that HomeGrocer.com has received for this latest round of financing clearly indicates that we have a model that is both viable and sustainable." 

- Homegocer's CEO in 1999 Press Release announcing $100mm round 

Chris Dixon's blog post from today about how to select your angel investors talks about a common mistake entrepreneurs make - choosing an investor based on their "celebrity value (by "celebrity" I generally mean in the TechCrunch sense, not the People magazine sense)." 

The same is true for choosing VCs, board members and advisors. We've invested with plenty of famous VCs and board members who were extremely well connected to the CEOs and boards of companies such as Microsoft, Oracle, Cisco, Intel and many other Fortune 500 companies. 

In our experience, celebrity investors and board members do little to help entrepreneurs do what they need to get done. They offer little in the way of strategic or practical advice about hiring, firing, product development, closing deals and financing. Even worse, sometimes the advice can be out of touch with what is going on in the industry or company but due to their celebrity status, some off the cuff comments can carry too much weight. 

Perhaps the most value that celebrities bring to the table are connections (even Chris in his blog post applauded "connectors" who can "introduce you to key people when you need it"). In practice, however, most people with great connections guard their rolodexes. 

Even when an intro is made directly to the CEO of a BIG company, it will get passed down the organization (usually down several levels) to the real decision makers. If the company is well run, the CEO will let his/her people make the decisions. 

If you do choose to use high level connections to force a deal through you should be warned that such a deal can backfire. If you don't take the time to build real support with the right people in the organization, they can do many things on a day to day basis which can ultimately sabotage the deal down the road (and distract you from what you should have been doing in the first place). 

My advice to entrepreneurs is to build your own buzz, based on fundamentals (an excellent banker advised one of our companies to "build your own heat" - it was good advice). You have to deliver real value! 

Also, please, please, please focus on generating your own leads. No matter how big your board or how well connected your advisors are they will NEVER produce the quantity or quality of leads your own team (and sales/marketing engine) will produce for you if you are going to be successful building a real business. 

In my experience, the entrepreneurs who see the most value from celebrity investors/board members and "advisors" build nothing of real value themselves. On the flip side, the best entrepreneurs see little value from celebrities (in fact, they probably find them distracting, if not somewhat annoying). 

Ironically, celebrities begin to embrace entrepreneurs once they think they are going to be successful anyway - with or without them. As it turns out, most celebrities need you more than you need them.

As far as I'm concerned, the real stars are entrepreneurs who create something from nothing.

Disclosure: As Chris D. admitted, as a non-celebrity but hard working small investor, this post is almost entirely self serving.

Overcommitted

Hard working entrepreneurs and their companies often feel over-committed. There are always too many things to get done and not enough resources.

One of our companies that is growing at 200%+ this year was feeling that way and we had a serious discussion about various options. One was to do a better job of account management so that expectations of customers and partners do not get ahead of our ability to deliver. Another option was to raise more funding and hire more people. A third option was to make tough decisions about what to cut (this is not an exhaustive list but will give you a flavor for the discussion).

The third option is a hard one to swallow, especially when things are going well. We have customers lining up and a window of opportunity that may close if we don't go for it - NOW! An easy answer would be to raise more money and ride the momentum.

After much discussion/debate, we made a decision to cut. We did not cut people. In fact, we will continue to hire. But we cut some very promising initiatives and we will have to turn away customers that are ready to pay (or have already paid).

Cutting can be scary, but it can also be liberating. It is not 100% clear that we made the right decision but here are two interesting quotes to think about, if you ever find yourself in a similar discussion with your board/investors:

"The essence of commitment is making a decision. The Latin root for decision is to 'cut away from,' as in an incision. When you commit to something, you are cutting away all your other possibilities, all your other options."
    -The Lombardi Rules, Rule #6 - Be Totally Committed 

"A great company is more likely to die of indigestion (from too much opportunity) than starvation (from too little)."
    -David Packard ("Packard's Law")

A Modest Proposal for the Venture Industry: Better Customer Service

There has been much talk lately about the demise of the venture capital industry.  Big funds are imploding after a decade of poor industry returns.  The causes are many: wacky capital markets, Sarbanes-Oxley regulation, ballooning fund sizes, misaligned incentives, generational turnover, etc.  Reviving the industry was such a big topic at this year’s National Venture Capital Association meeting that NVCA leaders issued a bold set of proposals to jumpstart the industry.

I haven't spent much time trying to dissect the causes of our industry’s current malaise.  But one thing I know for sure is that we are doing a lousy job of basic customer service.  How bad?  If you google “venture capitalists suck” you will get more results than “United Airlines sucks”.  A totally inaccurate measure to be sure, but to be anywhere near United Airlines on the suckage scale is not something that our profession should be proud of.  I think we can do better. 

So let me make a more modest proposal.     

We venture investors could do a lot for the reputation and health of our profession by getting back to the basics of good customer service. 

Many of us have forgotten that our business, after all, is to serve investors who entrust us with their capital and entrepreneurs who entrust us with their dreams.   Having raised money at three start-ups before starting in venture, I have more than a few opinions on how venture professionals could act more, well, professional.  Let me start with a few simple ones:

1.    Return calls (and emails)
One of the classiest and most successful venture investors I’ve ever met is Brook Byers of Kleiner Perkins.  Early in my career, I asked him at a panel discussion to share the secret to his success.  He explained that one of his basic rules of doing business was to call people back by the following day.  It sounds so simple, yet every week I talk to entrepreneurs who drive themselves insane wondering when the VC they met is going to call them back.  I’m not talking about unsolicited inquiries (only the appropriate ones of which deserve a response); I’m talking about getting back to people with whom we’ve already met.   Email overload is no excuse.  Not when we’re checking our Blackberries every five minutes.

2.    Pay attention
Which brings me to my next suggestion.  I vividly recall pitching my third startup to a famous Sand Hill venture capitalist back in 1999.  We had studied his portfolio, prepared a customized presentation and shown up early for the meeting, only to have him spend the hour distractedly munching a bag of peanuts and tossing the shells on the table in front of us.  Now that a decade has passed and peanuts have given way to Blackberries, it is a rarity that I sit through a meeting where a VC is not checking email, surfing the Web or popping out to make a phone call.  What’s the point of making all the physical effort to get face-to-face only to be mentally absent?  I’m as guilty as any, so let me resolve immediately and publicly to put my Blackberry away when meeting with entrepreneurs, or at least use it as a drink coaster.

3.    Just say NO
Given that we need to turn down 99% of the ideas that come our way, you would think that VCs would be pretty good at saying “no” to entrepreneurs.   The best salespeople and entrepreneurs know that a quick “no” is better than a long “maybe”.  Some of my VC colleagues don’t like to say “no” to keep their options open for a potential investment, but the vast majority just don’t like using the two-letter word because they are nice people.  They hem and haw and say something about having to “talk to the partnership”, then worry for weeks about how to make up a reason for declining the opportunity.  I’ve resolved to either tell entrepreneurs in the meeting or get back to them within a week.  It sure has made my life a lot easier and I hope it’s helped them waste less of their precious time.

4.    Be accountable
All this is easy to say, but aside from some community rating sites like thefunded.com, venture capitalists are simply not accountable to entrepreneurs.  At Altos, we’ve begun measuring the time it takes us to get initial and follow-up responses to entrepreneurs, but we are by no means perfect.  For a profession that generates all of its returns from the hard work of entrepreneurs, we sure do a lousy job of customer service.  So hold me to what I say.  Call me on it.  If I (or my partners) don’t follow my own advice in this blog, just email alee@altosventures.com and you’ll get a response from me.  If I still don’t get back to you, then you should probably give up on us and try United Airlines instead.

Burn the Ships!

The past 6 months have been two of the toughest quarters in decades. Almost every company is struggling - but some are surviving and some are not. What separates them?

I want to share an observation. There seems to be one common theme across every Silicon Valley company that I've seen go out of business. For some reason, the management of companies that abruptly shut their doors thought that they would get more funding. It could have been VC funding, debt financing or some other source of outside capital. That was their back-up plan. They were counting on it.

If you are an entrepreneur, you should have the attitude that there will be no-one to save you. There will be no outside capital. You have to generate revenues, cut costs, make the business model work - or find some way to survive until you do.

This doesn't mean that entrepreneurs should not raise any debt or equity financing. It just means they should never, ever count on it.

In Silicon Valley, it almost seems as if entrepreneurs count on VC as a business model. They aspire to become adept at raising VC money and "exiting" in a few years. What ever happened to the idea of building a real business, funded by paying customers? How about building a company that can stand alone, built to last?

In a book called Predictable Irrational, I found a story that every entrepreneur should think about.

In 210 BC, a Chinese commander named Xiang Yu led his troops across the Yangtze River to attack the army of the Qin (Ch'in) dynasty. Pausing on the banks of the river for the night, his troops awakened in the morning to find, to their horror, that their ships were burning. They hurried to their feet to fight off the attackers, but soon discovered that it was Xiang Yu himself who had set their ships on fire... With their ships gone, the soldiers had no route of retreat. Winning was the only option. 

They won 9 battles in a row before defeating the mighty Qin forces.

If you are an entrepreneur and you think that you will need some more funding to survive - or thrive - I have one piece of advice for you. Burn the ships.

RIP Good Times? A Different Perspective

Rip Good Times A Different Perspective

View SlideShare presentation or Upload your own. (tags: venture capital)

I put this presentation together to encourage a group of entrepreneurs I was to speak to at a conference in Reno, NV last week.

It's funny how times change.

People who have been following our blogs over the past 2 years know that we've had a more pessimistic, contrarian view of the venture business, even as the number of VC investments, fund sizes, deal sizes and valuations had been going up.

Now, of course, the world is totally different. Whether or not you believed that we were in a Web 2.0 technology bubble, Sequoia declared that the good times were over and it's now time to hunker down and fight for survival. In their widely publicized "RIP Good Times" meeting, they extolled the virtues of cash conservation to all of their CEOs and told them that they had to change in order to survive.

Now, we are contrarians again.

Our companies did not need Sequoia to tell them cash is king. They had been operating that way for years. In fact, more than a third of all of our companies are on track to be profitable this quarter. Many have been maintaining profitability while growing for many years.

The reason that we feel like we are contrarians again is that we have not seen such a good environment for building companies in years. Entrepreneurs are more focused on getting to profitability and building companies based on solid fundamentals. Before, we felt like lonely voices in the VC world, which seems to be filled with people working toward billion dollar exits for money losing companies.

Over this entire year, we've noticed a trend. Some of our companies started seeing a steady flow of high quality resumes from competitors. I think it's now about to turn into a flood! It will be much easier to hire great people who are more hungry and realistic about compensation and how long it will take to build shareholder value.  

For entrepreneurs in it for the long haul, this downturn just bought them more time. Impatient VCs won't be hounding them to take more risk, to grow faster, to get more aggressive. Remember, as an entrepreneur, you have one company. You don't have a portfolio of companies. You can't afford to play venture lotto.

Remember what we said back in 2006 about Foxes and Hedgehogs in Silicon Valley?

"Foxes are great at raising capital - they thrive in bubble markets. Hedgehogs would rather bootstrap - they do far better during the inevitable crashes."

For all you hedgehogs out there, this is your time to shine!

Don't Worry, Be Scrappy

“Don’t worry” does not exactly sound like responsible advice at a time like this. After all, we often remind our CEOs of Andy Grove’s famous adage that “only the paranoid survive”.

But it is a serious piece of advice that we are giving to all of our portfolio entrepreneurs. Over the last two weeks, many of our portfolio CEOs (and fund investors) have been asking us for our take on the current financial crisis. So here it is:

The bad news

Let’s first understand that things will be bad – really bad. In fact, this downturn will almost certainly be deeper and longer than the post-Bubble “nuclear winter” of 2001-2004 that so many of us struggled through as entrepreneurs and investors. That crash was precipitated by a financial bubble seeded largely by the venture/technology markets and abetted by all-too-willing public investors. But despite the fall in IT spending and concurrent drop in the NASDAQ index, the general economy kept humming along. In the five dark years following NASDAQ’s peak on March 9 2000, the Dow Jones actually went up. In the same five year period, the national housing price index nearly doubled. Most Americans hardly noticed the Internet Bubble and crash.

Now this is a totally different story. This economic crisis is about all of us. It’s about a fundamental realignment in global asset values. Whatever happens to venture/technology will be collateral damage, but will likely be worse than what we in tech experienced after the Internet Bubble. If that felt like a nuclear winter to tech companies, this one may well be an ice age for all of us. We may be wrong about this, but we’d rather be wrong on the upside than wrong on the downside.

The good news

As an entrepreneur, there are a lot of factors that figure into your success or failure. Some you control and most you don’t. Macroeconomics is one that you certainly don’t. So if, like me, you believe in worrying only about the things you can control, then this is a great time to get focused on building your business and stop fretting about the economy (see Focus on the Controllables).

In fact, a recession is probably the best time to start a company. Great companies like Disney, GE, HP and Microsoft were all started during recessions. As the clever folks at Google like to say, “creativity loves constraints”.

Why?  Bad times can build good DNA.  A down economy does not leave room for entrepreneurial sloppiness. It forces entrepreneurs to be honest about how good their products are. It mandates financial discipline. In other words, it is a perfect time to get focused, get real and get lean.

After the giddy NASDAQ highs of March 2000, it took most people way too long to come to grips with reality. I had personally just joined the venture business and my first company, Evolve Software, went public in August 2000 – a full half year after the peak. Most companies did not start cutting back until late 2001 and by then it was too late. The smart and lucky ones survived the ensuing five years and some became big winners. But most companies just ran out of money and ran out of time.

The rules

Plenty of smart people have already made prudent recommendations to their teams about what to do in this environment, so I won't repeat. See in particular Sequoia’s doom and gloom presentation to their portfolio CEOs earlier this week and Jason Calacanis’ email. But let me summarize with just two simple rules that we've tried to impress upon all of our CEOs:

Rule #1: Don’t run out of cash.

Rule #2: See Rule #1.

Then, go out and build the next great company.

Ousting the Founder

I was shocked to learn this week that Diane Greene, the co-founder and CEO of VMWare was ousted. I was not alone. Except for senior management (who found out very late, the night before) the employees of VMWare read about it, just like I did on Tuesday morning.

I guess $1.3B in revenues, $14B market cap, 50% growth rate and market dominance was not good enough for the board/EMC. One slight miss in one quarter and BANG! You're out. Perhaps the board believed industry pundits and worried about competition from Microsoft. So they brought in a "heavy hitter"...former Microsoft exec Paul Maritz as CEO.

I'd guess that the more likely reason was that Diane Green was a difficult person to deal with. There is no doubt that she was a controversial CEO. It was her way or the highway and she churned through senior execs (especially in sales and marketing). She never gave much respect to the folks at EMC either (who owned the vast majority of the stock - and controlled the board).

Some other hard-headed, "controversial" founder/CEOs that come to mind are Bill Gates, Larry Ellison, and Steve Jobs. These founders may be difficult to deal with but I'd rather go with them than take my chances with a new hired gun CEO.

Over the years, we've observed that it's difficult, if not impossible, to match the passion and commitment that founders bring to their companies. It's not just a job for them. It's deeply personal. The difference in commitment is akin to the differences you might observe between missionaries and mercenaries (or hedgehogs versus foxes).

Look, I have nothing against Paul. I'm sure he's a very smart, capable and hard working guy. But this whole situation reminded me of the time Steve Jobs was ousted from Apple more than 20 years ago.

As co-founder and CEO, Diane Green built one of the all time great successes in Silicon Valley. Very, very few companies ever reach $1B in revenues. Even fewer in the technology industry. Even fewer in the software industry. And even fewer ever exceed $10B in market cap.

Why the hell would you fire her?? No, don't tell me...I've heard all the reasons. VCs oust founders all the time. I've been in plenty of board level discussions around this topic!

It's almost a rite of passage in Silicon Valley. As a founder, you start a company, get VCs to fund you, recruit a "world class" management team...and eventually, find your replacement (or get ousted).

What people seem to miss, however, is that just about every great company ever created - in technology as well as low-tech, was built by a founder (or a CEO who happened to join the company very early in its growth phase) and a team of dedicated people who grew with their companies.

I don't believe in "world class" management in the generic sense. "World class" in what??

What I believe in is people who learn on the job and become - over time - the best at what they do. Along the way, they make plenty of mistakes. But that's part of the learning (and perhaps the luck of it - because the mistakes happen to be not fatal for the survivors).

Think about it. Some examples of great companies led by founders for decades are GE, UPS, FedEx, Wal-Mart, Southwest Airlines, HP, Intel, SAP, SAS, Apple, Oracle, Microsoft, Adobe, Sun, Dell, Qualcomm, Broadcom, Nvidia, Dolby, Amazon.com, Salesforce.com, etc.

There are some great companies where the original founder(s) did not grow the company but the CEO who grew the business to $1B+ in revenues joined very early on in the life of the company (typically below $10mm in sales): IBM, McDonald's, Starbucks, Veritas, Cisco and Google are examples.

It'll be interesting to see what happens. Even a founder hanging on to the bitter end won't save some companies (i.e. Wang, DEC). But I'd rather take my chances with the founder who built a $1B business from scratch than go with someone new.

The average tenure of the CEOs in our three largest companies is 9 years. They learned on the job. None of them had been CEO before we started working with them. None had much experience in their industry - the market did not exist, and the technology and business models had not yet been invented. But they are guys who took us this far (average sales of nearly $90mm this year) and we will gladly stick with them as long as they still want the job.

I'd rather take my chances with the people who built the business and grew their companies than the "professionals" - the hired guns - the mercenaries - coming in, after the fact, to "fix" things or to "take it to the next level."

We tell all of our companies this - if you want to build the leader in your industry, you have to have the world's leading experts in your field working for you. But do NOT expect to find them outside of your company. Someone senior from the outside won't come in to show you the way. They won't save you.

Think about it. If you can go outside and hire a CEO or other very senior executives to come in to YOUR company and tell you what to do and how to do it - better than you - then you've created nothing special. There is no secret sauce and you have NO CHANCE of building a truly great company.

We like to tell all of our companies this - the world's leading experts in your business will be the people you develop. The young people you hire today will be your future leaders. Five to ten years from now, they will BE the world's leading experts in your business. You will have to figure it out - together - along the way.

Don't count on those mythical "world class" managers to come in to save the day. Not only are there no guarantees, I believe they will end up hurting your chances of building a special, lasting company. If you do try to hire them anyway...good luck. What I will guarantee is this - they will negotiate HARD for a nice severance package.

Failing Fast

Lately, I’ve been telling all our companies to fail.  Fast.

It’s not that I’ve decided to throw in the towel. Quite the contrary. After doing startups for a dozen years, I’ve come to believe that the best way to maximize the chance of a big success is to fail often and fail fast.

Thomas Edison was one of history’s most successful failures. He failed more than a thousand times before inventing the incandescent light bulb. When Edison finally figured it out, he famously said: “I didn’t fail a thousand times. The light bulb was an invention with a thousand steps.”

The idea of taking a thousand steps is core to our investment philosophy here at Altos.  We’ve come to understand that every company goes through a series learning processes – about new markets, products, distribution strategies, etc. My partner Brendon wrote a great post on the fact that there is just no substitute for time when going through these learning cycles. Sometimes, the outcome of learning means tweaking the product to meet unforeseen customer needs; other times it means completely scrapping the business model and starting fresh. In fact some of our most successful companies started with one business and ended up with something entirely different. Put a smart, tenacious team against a big market opportunity with enough operating runway, and you have a decent formula for success.

Failing fast is even more imperative in the world of Web-based software and services. Back when I was a rookie product manager, I’d spend months perfecting product requirements documents (PRDs) that would disappear into an engineering organization only to emerge months or years later as a finished software product. Nowadays, that one-shot, monolithic approach is just not a competitive option.

Failing fast requires companies to think about perfecting their products differently. To quote LinkedIn founder Reid Hoffman, “If you are not embarrassed by the first version of your product, you’ve probably launched too late.” Perfecting a product the first time out is impossible, but getting it out and iterating a thousand times just might get you close.

Some of our best development teams cull user feedback into new priorities to build/test/release on a weekly cycle. It doesn’t really matter whether they are using newer lightweight tools like Ruby on Rails and Adobe Flex or “heavier” Microsoft-centric stacks. The key is to obsessively listen to and incorporate feedback from Web users who aren’t afraid to tell you if their release sucks (or not). Keep what sticks, toss what stinks.

Of course, just failing a lot is no guarantee for success. There are plenty of teams that just fail all the way to a big fat zero. These teams either spend too much time and money failing or don’t fail in the right ways. Let me elaborate:

One corollary to failing fast is failing cheaper. Josh Kopelman has a good post (and investment model) on this, so I’ll let that him tell you all about it.

A second corollary to failing fast is failing well. Systems that fail well compartmentalize and minimize a failure so that it does not impact the whole system – for instance, a sealed chamber in the hold of a cargo ship that allows a single area to absorb damage without flooding the entire hold. Failing well is a lesson most of us learned in high school chemistry lab: isolating experimental variables by using a scientific control. Similarly, start-up teams that fail well run multiple experiments to get small, controlled failures. These teams understand that failure is a desirable and necessary byproduct of the learning process. They are humble, smart and fast.

So don’t be afraid to fail. Don’t even be afraid to be embarrassed. It’s all just part of being successful.

The Ramp Phase, Jack Welch and a Coin Flip

The "ramp phase" is a period that my partners and I define as a hyper-growth phase somewhere between $10mm and $100mm in sales. It is perhaps the most exciting period in a young company's development. After years of hard work and tinkering, getting the product, packaging, pricing and positioning right (or at least good enough), you think that your company is finally ready to scale. By the time you reach this phase, you have a business model that is starting to work and lots of raving customers. Most companies don't even make it this far, so you are feeling great about things...

At this phase, most VCs are ready to invest big dollars and encourage entrepreneurs to be aggressive. They say, it's time to break through or get left in the dust. VCs don't invest in lifestyle businesses, you have to go for it!  Don't sand bag. Shoot for the moon! Those projections are not exciting enough...it's not BIG enough...the stakes are getting bigger...yada, yada, yada.

Let's get real.

Something that we see all the time when we drill down into sales projections of start-ups is a failure to take into account hiring mistakes that inevitably occur as companies ramp a sales-force.

Sales is typically the department which has the highest turnover in companies going through the ramp phase. Over the years, we've seen hundreds of sales reps get hired (last year alone, our companies hired 200+ sales reps) only to see most of them struggle, get fired or quit at some point along the way.

Based on our experience, less than one out of two new sales reps end up working out. Whether you have voluntary or involuntary turnover, the end result is the same - you end up with fewer sales reps than planned.

Given the time spent on each hire (plus recruiting fees) a lot of precious start-up resources are wasted. Some of this waste is unavoidable. It's just the cost of doing business. However, we believe that much of the waste can be avoided if companies apply some realism.

For example, when it comes to making sales rep or any other types of hires, the sobering reality is that many mistakes will be made. In fact, it's a virtual coin flip according to Jack Welch (who recently discussed this issue with one of our CEOs).

What exactly did he mean by this?

Basically, Welch thought that he was no better than 50/50 early in his career. Half of the hires he made were good and half were mistakes (which he tried to correct as quickly as possible).

Think about it. If Jack Welch (one of the most respected and talented businessmen of his generation) thought that his hiring decisions were no better than a coin flip, what are your odds?

Over the course of his career, Jack, of course, did get better (he was a learning machine and tried to mold GE into a learning organization). How much better?  Well...after 40+ years of hiring and firing people, Jack thought that he got to 70/30 for really important hiring decisions - such as a CEO hire.

In other words, even at the end of his career, he was very aware of the fact that he can (and would) make hiring mistakes a large percentage (at least 30%) of the time - no matter how hard he tried to avoid them.

The bottom line is this - making good hiring decisions is extraordinarily difficult to do. It's a super high risk activity. The risk level is higher, of course, when you're looking to fill critical positions (like CEOs) but even for lower rank, more "cookie cutter" hires (like sales reps) the risk is high (at least much higher than most people perceive).

So, as a CEO or VP Sales of a start-up projecting that "shoot for the moon" sales ramp, you have to ask yourself this question....are you going to be much better than Jack Welch at sizing people up?

If not, you had better plan for at least one in three new hires NOT working out. If you want to be realistic, plan on every other sales rep not producing for you (and try to correct your mistakes ASAP). If you actually planned for this, how would you modify spending in the rest of the company? How would you change your plans on ramping marketing, customer support, R&D, etc?

If you are indeed a superstar (or just super lucky) and you end up making better hiring decisions than Jack Welch...good for you. Use the extra cash-flow generated by your sales-force to reinvest for even faster growth.

But for planning purposes...I would not count on being much better (or luckier) than Jack.

LEARNING TO GIVE A DAMN

Almost every venture capitalist I know lists passion as one of the most important traits they look for in entrepreneurs.  Most VCs, I am sure, also talk about their own commitment and passion when pitching themselves to limited partners.

My personal lessons in observing people with real passion came from my Army days as a 22 year-old lieutenant in charge of about 40 people.

On one Saturday night approaching midnight, my boss called me at home. He said, “LT (that is what we were called, especially when he was angry about something), come over to the motor-pool right now.” The motor-pool was where we kept all of our equipment such as trucks, tanks, dozers, etc. When I got there, I saw my boss standing nearby a truck with a flashlight. As he saw me approaching, he threw a maintenance book at me, and said, “We are going to go through the standard maintenance inspection of this truck…together.”

When we got done, we found the truck with only half-filled gas tank (it is supposed to be full at all times when inside the motor-pool), malfunctioning fire extinguisher, and without several items that belonged in the truck at all times. After the inspection, I was embarrassed. My boss then smiled, held up a cigarette butt, and said, “LT, I knew one of your trucks was due in around 11PM. So, I just came by and looked inside the truck. And I found several cigarette butts and empty coke cans. I knew then I had to teach you an important lesson on leadership. That is to give a damn.”

He then explained, “If a soldier does not care to clean up the truck when he reports back in, then he probably did not bother refueling. Furthermore, there is a high probability that he is not taking care of the truck every day.” At that moment, he grew very serious, and said, “You have to care. You have to make sure your soldiers care. Otherwise, you and I will be explaining to the soldier’s loved ones why his truck ran out of fuel, did not reach the destination, and got killed by enemy fire.

My second lesson came from a sergeant who was at least a decade older than me. On the first night of our field exercise, he got me up in the middle of the night. He said, “Sir, get up. You don’t have time to be sleeping. Come with me.” He then took me around every guard post, checked to see if anyone had wet boots (and when he/she did, immediately had them change socks and boots and personally applied foot powder), and talked with them about family, girlfriends/boyfriends, and football teams, etc.

After checking with every guard, he then said, “Sir, the guards change every two hours. You should get some shut-eye now. But in thirty minutes, I am going to wake you up. And you are going to do what I did with every set of guards.” My sergeant truly cared about his soldiers. He wanted to make sure I also learned to give a  damn.

My Army days feel distant as I go through my days as a venture capitalist. The risks VCs take on are far from matters of life and death, but the lessons I learned in giving a damn gives me proper conviction to stick to what we call a responsible way to build companies.

I wonder ...what would all VCs do if they gave a damn?

If VCs gave a damn, they would be more interested in building special companies than flipping them, just to make money. They would pay attention and not spray and pray their investments, hoping to get lucky.

Also, they would not over-commit by taking on too much money, too many companies and too many board seats. They would capitalize companies responsibly, not according to how much money they had to invest.

Finally, they would take the time to get to know the businesses and people involved. They would focus on developing talent and not rush out to hire mercenaries looking for quick fixes. There are no short cuts. It is critical to make the proper trade-offs between growth, profitability and sustainability.

Fear of The Living Dead in Venture Capital

It was not until I got into the VC business that I found out about the terrible, dreadful "living dead" - a term used to describe companies that merely survive, without future prospects. Normally fearless VCs fear the living dead. So do our LPs (the people who invest in VCs) who worry that we might waste our time (and their money) on a bunch of little companies that go nowhere.

Venture Capital is a "shoot for the moon" - go for the homeruns - business (for more on this topic see Swinging For the Fences). Most deals won't work out but great VCs bounce back quickly and easily. They focus on the winners and waste as little time as possible on the losers. When you think about it, the living dead might be far worse than the total losers because they continue to go on and on...potentially sucking up valuable time, energy and resources...indefinitely. Yikes! No wonder VCs fear the living dead!

The bigger you are (whether in size of wallet or ego) the more you will think that wasting time and money on little ideas and small deals is not worthwhile. For example, Larry Ellison believes that there will be only a handful of survivors in the software business - Oracle, Microsoft, SAP and IBM. To Larry, all others in the software business are as good as dead (or the living dead).

BUT, if you're really dead, then you have no chance.

In the VC business, all of our companies, even the very best, follow a rather bumpy and windy road. In the beginning, every company looks like a struggling little company with uncertain prospects.

The best approach to take in venture capital is to relish in uncertainty and to have a little humility.

There is no way to control outcomes in the start-up game. What you can control is whether or not you do your best and make sound decisions (like spending your time and money wisely) and just deal with problems (and take advantage of opportunities) as they come. If you stay hungry and learn along the way - and just manage to somehow survive - you give yourself a chance to make course corrections, take advantage of changes (often unexpected) in market conditions, or just get plain lucky once in a while.

So let's get back to basics...if you really want to have a chance at a homerun, you have to, first and foremost, make sure that your company survives.

Surprisingly, this is not obvious to some people.

One prominent LP once told me that he would rather have us return NOTHING than to play it safe. He was serious - dead serious. He wanted "volatility" because that's what is expected from the so called VC "asset class."

When I first heard this advice I was a bit shocked!

At Altos, rather than worrying about the dead, the living dead or the homeruns, we focus our early stage companies on getting to 1st base - typically around $10mm in revenues - without burning through a lot of capital.

If we can get to 1st base, then we might start to believe that there could be an interesting business forming. In our experience, most companies don't even make it that far, especially if people get obsessed with creating the next BIG whatever.

After reaching 1st base, some companies might go out of business (the equivalent of getting tagged out at 1st), or get bought out, or start slowing down. Only a minority of the companies that make it to $10mm, make it to 2nd base, or $40mm in revenues. At that level, we start to be fairly certain that we will have a winner...but we still don't know whether or not we have a homerun.

At this stage, some more companies might get acquired and others will start flattening out in growth (start-ups rarely go out of business at this stage but, as in baseball, you CAN get tagged out from 2nd base). Again, only a minority of companies break through to the next level...this time to 3rd base, or $100mm in revenues.

Once 3rd base is reached, VCs will typically get a 10x return on investment (sometimes 100x-1,000x, depending on market froth/timing). By that time, we also know that management is competent, scrappy and adaptable, through multiple iterations of products, strategies, business models.

By the time a company gets to 3rd base, at least 5 years (sometimes 10+ years) have passed. In the technology industry, that's an awfully long time! Whether or not a $100mm company can become a much larger company depends on countless factors that are largely unknowable at the time of investment.

We will submit that there is no way to know - a priori - which company will turn out to be a homerun at the time a company starts out (or when VCs invest).

Here is a thought experiment.

If you were really great at predicting the homeruns (and the losers), what would happen if you abandoned the VC business and started a hedge fund? If you can predict the winners and losers when companies have insignificant revenue streams, then you should be even better at predicting when companies reach $100mm (around the time of an IPO). Hedge fund managers can invest tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars at a time - buying or shorting public companies.

If you had invested in companies such as Oracle, Microsoft, SAP, Dell, Cisco and dozens of other companies shortly after their stocks were publicly available, you could have made 100x or more on each deal. So why waste time investing single digit millions in puny little companies?

As VCs, we love investing in tiny little companies started by passionate founders in interesting, dynamic markets. They always start as small, obscure, insignificant little companies that struggle along the way. The path is NEVER smooth!

It is a fact that most VC backed companies won't even make it to 1st base let alone home plate. But if we build solid businesses, based on sound fundamentals, we've seen that some do break through...to 1st, then 2nd, then 3rd, before reaching for home. We just don't know which ones will break through, often for many years after we invest.

We have ten year funds because it takes time as well as a great deal of hard work and suffering, enduring the ups and downs that come along for each and every company as they grow.

But hey, I'm not complaining about all that suffering (didn't Buddha say that "life is suffering"?). We actually love the bumps and bruises we get along the way. Some might say it builds character. But that's not the real truth. To actually LOVE IT, I'd say that great entrepreneurs, as well as VCs, are a bit quirky (some might even say that they are mentally imbalanced).

Rational or not, it has taken me a while to get over my fears...I fear not, the living dead.