Altos Ventures Musings

Replacing CEOs

I regret to say that I've personally served on a dozen boards of venture backed companies that have replaced CEOs. It's usually not a good sign. It doesn't mean those start-ups were doomed; but it does mean drastic change was needed.

The decision to replace a CEO is never taken lightly. Replacing any CEO is difficult enough. Replacing a founder/CEO is even more traumatic and fraught with risk.

Although I have never seen a case in which a CEO, even a founder, is indispensable, over the years, my partners and I have formed a strong preference for founders.

Most founders have never been a CEO. Some may have never even had a corporate job (Mark Zuckerberg, for example). Yet we prefer to work with them as they learn on the job. 

I won't get into why we prefer founders (not the main topic of this post) but I'd recommend checking out these articles discussing the merits of founder CEOs: 

• I first wrote about our preference for founders three years ago: Ousting the Founder 
• Ben Horowitz wrote this more recently: Why we prefer founding CEOs 
• Steve Jobs' Law: Why Founders Make the Best Leaders

When my partners and I first got started more than 15 years ago, we replaced CEOs quite often (though I'd esimate it was about average for the VC industry as a whole. I'll share actual data later in this post). In contrast, my eight most recent boards have yet to replace a CEO.

One data point which reflects the presence of founder CEOs in venture portfolios is CEO ownership. When we tell people that the typical CEO in an Altos backed company owns more than twice the equity of a typical venture backed CEO, they assume it's because we invest less money (resulting in less dilution). While this is true, the bigger factor is that most of our CEOs are founders.

On average, the minute a board replaces a founder/CEO, that company's CEO ownership percentage drops. For example, when Eric Schmidt was hired at Google, the CEO ownership stake dropped to 4%, far lower than Larry Page's stake. 

Another reason we replace CEOs less often is selection bias. We are less likely to invest in the first place if we believe a new CEO will be needed. I'm always surprised when a VC submits a term sheet that calls for the retained search for a new CEO from day one.

We'd rather not make an investment, if we don't know who the CEO will be. As the saying goes, "go with the devil you know versus the devil you don't." We must believe, at least in the beginning, that the person we're backing can develop into a great CEO.

In the case of backing a "professional CEO" we must believe that the person has what Warren Buffett calls "owner mentality" (it might not be as good as founder mentality, but it's better than most). 

Of course, this does not mean that we will never fire a founder or replace a CEO. We make plenty of mistakes. To see if we might learn from them, I decided to look at some data from our current and past funds.

After studying a data set of more than 60 companies, I found that the probability of a CEO change increases dramatically with each new round of financing, unless a company is already profitable. A CEO who can control her own destiny is much less likely to get replaced. 

Given that the companies in this data set have raised more than a billion dollars from over a hundred different venture firms, I suspect that there is a similar pattern for the entire VC industry, even if specifics vary from fund to fund. 

In the chart below, each bar represents a group of companies based on how many rounds of funding were required to get to profitability or exit. The height of each bar represents the percentage of companies that replaced CEOs. 

  In companies needing only one or two rounds to get to profitability or exit, CEOs were replaced less than 14% of the time. At the other extreme, if a company needed four rounds or more, the replacement rate sky-rocketed to 85%. For companies that required three rounds, the rate was 53%, which is about average for the industry (see article below). 

Given this data, I'd advise start-up CEOs to get their companies to profitability sooner. Control your own destiny. Otherwise, deliver an exit before you run out of money and have to raise another round. 

Other Factors:

When a CEO is replaced, the rationale is usually quite subjective. "The team has lost confidence" or "lack of leadership" are typical quotes from board members considering a change. 

For me personally, I've learned that my stress level about any particular company goes up and down with confidence in the CEO, regardless of how the company is doing. Let me try to explain. 

Even if a company is doing really well, if I do not have confidence in the CEO, I tend to worry a lot because things might fall apart; and sooner or later, the shit usually does hit the fan.

In contrast, even if a company is struggling, if my confidence in the CEO is high, I stress less because I know there is a smarter and more capable person staying up at night not only worrying about things but doing something about it. 

That said, other than obvious reasons such as lying, cheating or stealing, I believe the following are other, more objective, factors correlated with change in CEOs:

1. Time - eventually, all CEOs retire, die or get fired.
2. Lack of growth - a flat profitable business might be OK for some but not for VC backed companies that promised high growth to investors.
3. Employee turnover - higher than normal turnover happens for two reasons: great people are hired but are repelled or mediocre people are hired and must be replaced. Successful companies typically have turnover rates that are significantly lower than industry averages. 
4. Burn rate relative to cash balance (key metric we track is months of cash remaining)

More Data:

The following article has some interesting statistics. Out of 50 high-profile VC-backed companies in 2010, 54% had replaced founder CEOs: "Do VCs usually fire founder CEOs?" 

I'd also recommend checking out these questions on Quora for more info and discussion:

1. On average how often do founding CEOs get replaced by a VC controlled BoD?
2. How do VCs eventually come to the conclusion that they need to replace the CEO?
3. What skills does a CEO of a growing company need that a founder CEO might not have?

Final Note

I'd like to emphasize that the data points out a strong correlation, not causation. For example, it's possible that VCs are more likely to replace CEOs in companies that run out of money and have to raise more rounds. It's also possible (and very likely) that start-ups that hire professional CEOs tend to raise more money and go through more rounds of funding.

Founders are much more sensitive to dilution compared to professional management that are granted more options if a company goes through a massively dilutive round. Founders also want to maximize control. The biggest fortunes have been amassed by founders who have been able to retain quite a bit of control over their companies, sometimes decades after the IPO.

The punchline of the article should be "get profitable" rather than "avoid the 4th round."

They Can't Tell You How To Soar

Customers will always tell you they want better products and lower prices. They might even be able to articulate how much better certain products should be. But don’t expect them to be able to tell you how different those products could be. More importantly, don’t expect them to tell you how you should surprise and delight them.

This was an insight from a book called Different, Escaping the Competitive Herd written by Youngme Moon (I won't review the book but I'd recommend it for entrepreneurs and marketers fascinated by inconic brands such as Apple, Harley Davidson, IKEA and InNOut Burger). 

As Clayton Christensen explained in the Innovator's Dilemma, there is a predictable pattern in just about every product category. Innovation leads to products that improve to a point where customers are over-served (the web browser might be the latest category to reach this level).

From a vendor's perspective, the problem is that over-served customers become so skeptical about the differences between products and brands that differentiation is rendered meaningless. Most customers become not only bored but unhappy.

In category after category, over-served, bored and unhappy customers would love to discover something delightful, remarkable and refreshing. And marketers spend billions of dollars trying to rise above the competitive noise.

Ironically, intense competition only quickens the pace toward blandness and a herd mentality in markets. This trap is hard to escape. The herd phenomena is seen in self-organizing systems as disparate as ant colonies, bird flocks and stock markets. 

Paradoxically, the best way to stand out, might be to NOT focus on beating the competition. At the 1997 WWDC, before he rejoined Apple as CEO, Steve Jobs stated the following (32:43 of video):

"...the other thing I feel very, very, very strongly about is, it's incredibly stupid for Apple to get in a position where for Apple to win Microsoft has to lose. That's really dumb... Apple can win without having to have Microsoft lose."

Don't focus on being better. Don't fret over differentiation. Think Different. Be different. Transcend boundaries. Stand alone. Walk down a very lonely path. 

Something that every entrepreneur should keep in mind is what Jerry Garcia once said: 

"You do not merely want to be considered just the best of the best. You want to be considered the only ones who do what you do." 

What will you do? How will you be different? One place to start, is to be yourself. Be genuine.

To really, really soar, don't just be better, faster, cheaper. You can do better than that. And please, please, please, don't aspire to be "the Mint of XXX category" or "the AirBnB or YYY category" or the "Groupon of XYZ category."

Don’t Drink Your Own Kool-Aid

 

In my twenty years of working in and with startups, I’ve continually tried to figure out what makes some work and others not.  There are myriad factors of brilliance, determination, luck and timing that go into the success equation.  One of the most important and overlooked characteristics of successful entrepreneurs is objectivity: the ability to see and deal with reality in making decisions.

By their nature, startups are driven by passion, optimism, persistence, hope and dreams.  All these traits are essential to fueling the process of inventing a product and innovating a business model.  The beautiful thing about startups is that they are emotional and intellectual creations brought to life through shared vision and hard work.  

Company founders and CEOs get employees, customers and investors to take innumerable leaps of faith on the way to fulfilling their entrepreneurial visions. Mixing the Kool-Aid is an essential part of building a company (see also: eating your own dogfood).  But drinking your own Kool-Aid is the enemy of sound decisions. 

Here are three signs that you might be doing it:

1. Illusion: Some would say that most of the factors that drive success are outside of an entrepreneur’s control.  But most entrepreneurs suffer from the illusion of control - “the tendency for people to overestimate their ability to control events.”  This is as true for CEOs of small companies launching new products as it is for large companies planning corporate takeovers.  It is critically important to understand the difference between things you control and the things you don’t – and be clear and objective about that.

2. Hope:  Closely related to the illusion of control is optimism bias, or the "tendency for people to be over-optimistic about the outcome of planned actions."  While optimism is a fundamental part of entrepreneurism, its evil twin is hope.  The more desperate a company’s situation, the more you hear the word “hope” driving business decisions.  In a company meeting last week, my Spidey senses perked up when the CEO described the company’s next product launch in all-too-hopeful language.  He was “hoping” for vast improvements in four separate metrics (traffic, registration, engagement and conversion) to click in just the right way.  Did I want it to happen?  Absolutely.  Did I think it would?  Absolutely not.  As the old saying goes, “hope is not a plan.”

3. Spin: Good spin is essential to marketing your product to the world, but behind closed doors with your team or your board, you have to be brutally honest about the facts.  Startups are all about learning, and if there’s even one degree of spin on the data, it’s hard to learn the right lesson.  If your board meeting agenda looks like an actuarial recitation of facts and metrics, you’re on the right track.  If your board meeting agenda looks like a pitch deck, you’re not being objective.  Beware of underestimating competitors.  Beware of prematurely declaring victory.  Beware the phrase “conservative projections.” 

How can you avoid drinking too much of your own Kool Aid?  Here are a few ideas:

1. Metrics:  My investor friend Dave McClure is piratically fanatic about metrics.  Follow his advice: get religious about metrics.  Bad decisions thrive on incomplete data, speculation and opinion.  My favourite companies post their metrics up on big screens for everyone to see. The more you can instrument your business, the fewer places there are for bad decisions to hide. 

2. Culture:  As a leader in a company, it is critical to create a culture that allows for open, fact-based dialogue and dissent.  Highlight team members who get it right while being honest and self-deprecating about your own bad decisions.  Celebrate unconventional ideas.  Designate someone on your team to take the devil’s advocate role.  Beware groupthink. 

3. Friends: Friends don't let friends drive drunk.  And your good friends, your real supporters in the entrepreneurial enterprise, should not let you fool yourself either.  Don't surround yourself with people who just reinforce your worldview.  Surround yourself with advisors and investors who are honest enough to call bullshit.  But don't confuse brutal honesty with a lack of enthusiasm for you or your business.  It is absolutely necessary.

Every entrepreneur needs to mix some pretty strong Kool-Aid to persuade employees, customers and investors to come along for the fantastic ride of building a new company.  But the really great entrepreneurs know not to drink their own.

Another Perspective on Yahoo!

Paul Graham published an essay about "the problems that hosed Yahoo" which got shared by many people via Twitter and Hacker News. Many people called it "customarily brilliant." 

I really enjoy Paul's writings but this one didn't sit well with me. I disagreed with key points and came away concerned that young entrepreneurs would learn the wrong lessons from history.

In the essay, Paul suggests that Yahoo failed due to two problems - 1) easy money and 2) ambivalence about being a technology company.

Money

Paul takes us back to 1998, when Yahoo was riding high, making money from big brand advertisers as well as over-funded, "fat startups" (a term popularized recently by Ben Horowitz). In Paul's words, Yahoo was "a de facto beneficiary of a pyramid scheme."

I agree that too much easy money, especially over-funding, can harm companies. Too much money can mask problems. That said, I don't think it had much to do with Yahoo's demise.

We can second guess how Yahoo could have re-invested profits but I would not fault them for pursuing it. They built a very successful company which beat every competitor of their era. 

Everyone benefited from the bubble. If Yahoo had not taken the money it may have been diverted to others and weakened its competitive position. You have to be in the game to even have a chance at riding the next wave. 

Maybe what Paul meant to say was that Yahoo management should have recognized that they were lucky or that their business model was not sustainable?

In hindsight, it's clear that Yahoo did not appreciate the potential for search and perhaps over-estimated the quality of their revenues. But, as Paul acknowledged, no one else, including Larry and Sergei, knew how big search was going to be, in 1998.

It's hard to predict the future and deceptively easy to come up with simplistic explanations in hindsight. Yahoo beat its competitors hands down and built a very profitable, growing business. I would not diss them for it.

Paul's second point was about culture and leadership.

Hackers 

Paul suggests that Yahoo was a technology company but either didn't know it or were ambivalent about it. He also seems to imply that if hackers had run the place Yahoo would have been fine (or at least would not have been hosed).

I disagree with both points.

Yahoo was never a technology company. They were a media company (albeit a "new media" company) from the day that Dave and Jerry started serving up pages from their trailer at Stanford.

When Mike Moritz invested in Yahoo, it was the emerging brand and traffic that impressed, not the technology. Unlike Google, there was no core technology from day one. Later on, Yahoo did develop many technologies - they had to in order to scale (Hadoop is one example).

Bill Gates would have also said that Yahoo was never a technology company. When Gates saw Google, he saw a company that reminded him of Microsoft. It was probably the only company that ever scared him. He never had that reaction to Yahoo.

The important thing is not to be like a Google or Facebook (or the early Microsoft). The important thing is to be yourself. Be authentic. Be genuine.

So maybe Paul's point is that Yahoo didn't know who they were. Perhaps, but I disagree that Yahoo had to be like a Google or Facebook because that is not who they were.

Pixar is a great media company. The fact that they were founded by technologists doesn't confuse them. They even sell rendering software to other companies, including competitors. It doesn't diminish their identity as a media company. 

Disney is another example. Walt Disney Imagineering has been inventing cool new technologies for decades. They were the "new media" company of their generation. You don't have to fit someone else's mold. Be yourself. Be unique.

Another key point Paul seems to make is that "adult supervision" is bad. Implication seems to be that if hackers had run the place Yahoo may not have lost. Again, I disagree. 

There is good adult supervision and bad adult supervision.

Amazon is an interesting case study that, on the surface, defies hacker conventional wisdom. Even as they delve deeper into technology, Amazon's management is stacked with MBAs.

Even their most technical businesses, Amazon Web Services and Digital Media (including Kindle), are led by a Harvard MBA and a Stanford MBA, respectively. Even so, Amazon continues to attract and retain plenty of good hackers. In fact, momentum seems to be increasing in the hacker community. 

There is nothing inherently wrong with adult supervision or non-technical management per se.

That said, I do think people can get seduced by the belief that there is a mythical "world class" management team that can fix your company. On this front, I think Paul and I probably agree. Don't count on someone coming in from the outside to fix your company (or, in the case of Yahoo, your stock price). 

When the bubble crashed, Yahoo looked for a savior. In contrast, Amazon stuck with Jeff Bezos even though their stock took a similarly huge beating. Bezos likes to remind everyone how the pundits called them "Amazon dot toast."

Terry Semel knew little about Yahoo or the Internet when he took over in April, 2001. It quickly led to the mass exodus of the future leaders of Yahoo. The fallout we are witnessing now may still be the after shocks. 

To conclude, I'd like to share a great story about how Nike is still shaking up the shoe industry. When Phil Knight retired after almost 40 years as CEO, he decided to bring in fresh blood and passed over the leading internal candidate for CEO. 

Luckily, Nike had such a strong culture that it quickly rejected the outsider. The new CEO, from S.C. Johnson (the makers of Pledge, Windex and other cleaning products) lasted only 18 months. The new CEO is a home grown prodigy - a former shoe designer who was the internal CEO candidate in 2003. 

With 33,000 employees, there is plenty of "adult supervision." It just happens to be the right kind. 

Overcommitted

Hard working entrepreneurs and their companies often feel over-committed. There are always too many things to get done and not enough resources.

One of our companies that is growing at 200%+ this year was feeling that way and we had a serious discussion about various options. One was to do a better job of account management so that expectations of customers and partners do not get ahead of our ability to deliver. Another option was to raise more funding and hire more people. A third option was to make tough decisions about what to cut (this is not an exhaustive list but will give you a flavor for the discussion).

The third option is a hard one to swallow, especially when things are going well. We have customers lining up and a window of opportunity that may close if we don't go for it - NOW! An easy answer would be to raise more money and ride the momentum.

After much discussion/debate, we made a decision to cut. We did not cut people. In fact, we will continue to hire. But we cut some very promising initiatives and we will have to turn away customers that are ready to pay (or have already paid).

Cutting can be scary, but it can also be liberating. It is not 100% clear that we made the right decision but here are two interesting quotes to think about, if you ever find yourself in a similar discussion with your board/investors:

"The essence of commitment is making a decision. The Latin root for decision is to 'cut away from,' as in an incision. When you commit to something, you are cutting away all your other possibilities, all your other options."
    -The Lombardi Rules, Rule #6 - Be Totally Committed 

"A great company is more likely to die of indigestion (from too much opportunity) than starvation (from too little)."
    -David Packard ("Packard's Law")